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The International Conference on Harmonization of
Pharmaceutical Regulations, the European Medicines
Evaluation Agency,
and the FDA: Who's Zooming Who?
DAN KIDD*
INTRODUCTION
In the early 1990s the pharmaceutical industry underwent a worldwide
period of stagnation due to cost-containment pressures from governments and
insurance companies.' Pressure from the government came in the form of
many small and some not-so-small regulatory reforms. Variations and
inconsistencies in the regulatory schemes of the major drug markets resulted
in slower drug development, higher prices, and unfair competition. For at least
the past fifteen years, the dominant force behind the regulatory reforms in the
United States has been the idea of globalization.' Many people in the
government, the pharmaceutical industry, and the public finly believe that
international harmonization of regulatory standards would remedy the
situation
The industry probably began thinking and acting globally before
governments did. For many years, large multinational corporations have been
the rule rather than the exception in the drug business.4 The governments of
the United States, Japan, and Europe5 could not effectively act globally until
* J.D., (1996), Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington. The author would like to thank
Anthony Smith for his help in preparing this article.
1. See Innovative Management Means Shooting Sacred Cows, MARKETLETnER, Sept. 26, 1994,
available in 1994 WL 2717311. See also 1993 in Europe--A New Internationalism, MARKETLETTER, Jan.
10, 1994, available in 1994 WL 2622184 (noting that pressures on drug industry are without precedent in
Europe).
2. See generally Alfred C. Aman, Jr., A Global Perspective on Current Regulatory Reforms:
Rejection, Relocation, or Reinvention?, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (1995) (discussing the
similarities and continuities of the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations' market-oriented regulatory
reforms).
3. See Arthur Kibbe, Do FDA Services Cost Too Much?, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, OH), July 22,
1995, at I IB; Gerald Mossinghoff, Letter to the Editor, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ), May 11, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 8842057.
4. See generally James Gomez, O.C. Medical Device Companies Await Marketing Breakthrough
in Europe Sales, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 9, 1992, at ID (noting that drug companies are developing strategies to
take advantage of EC regulatory standardization).
5. The United States, Europe, and Japan account for more than 80% of the world's pharmaceutical
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1990 when the European Community (EC) Council approved the necessary
steps for drafting of the Maastricht Treaty, finalizing the creation of the
European Union (EU).6 However, around that time, those governments did
act, in partnership with the industry, by forming the International Conference
on Harmonization of Technical Requirements of Pharmaceuticals for Human
Use (ICH).7
There are several major forces at work behind international harmonization
as envisioned by the ICH: a borderless Europe under the EU, a drug industry
that is on the verge of a gold boom period,8 and an FDA which is under
continual pressure both from inside and outside the agency to be ever more
efficient.9 ICH holds out the hope that pharmaceuticals can be researched,
developed, and approved under one set of scientific standards that are rigorous
enough to satisfy the most thorough FDA investigator yet lenient enough to
allow the free flow of drugs throughout the industrialized world. Whether the
ICH can strike this delicate balance, with the various competing interests
pushing and pulling in a myriad of directions, is the subject of this Note.
Some form of international harmonization of the pharmaceutical industry
is inevitable, but whether it will be positive or negative is far from certain.
More importantly, how harmonization will be achieved is not at all clear. Will
the collaborative process of the ICH be continued and expanded? Will the EU
drug regulatory systems become the model for global harmony? Will the FDA
establish itself as the premier drug regulatory agency, forcing the rest of the
market. Europe's Pharmaceutical Industry in 1993, MARKETLETTER, Oct. 24, 1994, available in 1994 WL
2717542.
6. The EU was originally called the European Economic Community (EEC), then the European
Community. GEORGE A. BERMANN et al., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, 16,
18, 22, 23 (1993). The Maastricht Treaty implemented'several directives designed to create a truly
borderless society among the Member States, including giving the EU binding authority on health care
issues. David Vogel, Regulatory Interdependence in a Global Economy: The Globalization of
Pharmaceutical Regulation (Aug. 1995) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association) (on file with the Ind. J. Global Legal Stud.).
7. Global Harmonisation on Pharmaceutical Regulations a Step Nearer, PHARMACEUTICAL Bus.
NEWS, Nov. 15, 199 1, available in 1991 WL 2741479 [hereinafter Global Harmonisation].
8. Drug Health-Care Stocks Propel Dow to New High, THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 14, 1995, at
D4; Chris O'Malley, Tobias Bullish on Future of Health Care, id at D1. In Germany, sales of
pharmaceuticals are one of the few bright spots in the economy. Computers, Pharmaceuticals: Bright Spot
in German Retail, MARKET EUR., Nov. 1, 1994, available in 1994 WL 2106892.
9. The push for efficiency is a double-edged sword for the FDA. In the long term, harmonization
holds out the promise of improved efficiency, but a fiscally conservative Congress may not be willing to
support harmonization activities which do not have at least some immediate, short-term benefits.
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world to follow it? In this Note, I attempt to address these possibilities and
explore the problems associated with each."
Section I of this paper will review the short history of the ICH to date.
Section II will discuss the two-tier approval process of the EU. Section I will
examine at the direction of the FDA's approval procedure and enforcement
division. Finally, Section IV will address some of the other major barriers to
international harmonization.
I. HISTORY OF THE ICH
The idea for the International Conference on Harmonization originated in
a joint mission between Japan and the EU in 1988. The Conference was
comprised of representatives from the EU's Committee for Proprietary
Medicinal Products (CPMP) and the European Federation of Pharmaceutical
Industries' Associations (EFPIA)." The mission's goal was to resolve
differences between the safety and efficacy requirements of the various
countries. 2 Meanwhile, another EU agency was meeting with FDA and
Japanese officials in Japan. 3 In 1989, a conference between the regulatory
officials and the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Associations (IFPMA) led to the creation of the ICH process. 4
The ICH has two major goals. First, the countries and companies involved
want to harmonize the scientific requirements of the pharmaceutical regulatory
schemes in the United States, the European Union, and Japan. ICH is not
intended to replace the drug approval procedures of the participants. 5 Instead,
it is hoped that if the regulatory agencies all require the same data, differences
in the processes of approval will be of less significance than is currently the
case. 6 Underlying the goal of harmonization, the second and ultimate goal of
10. An evaluation of Japan's possible influences on the harmonization processes is beyond the scope
of this Note.
11. Joseph Contrera, The Food and Drug Administration and the International Conference on
Harmonization: How Harmonious Will International Pharmaceutical Regulations Become?, 8 ADMIN. L.J.
AM. U. 927, 939 (1995).
12. Id.
13. Id
14. Id at 939-40.
15. ICH does not promulgate, and is in fact powerless to promulgate, any binding regulations. ICH
issues harmonized guidelines which become binding only if enacted into law by each of the individual
nations by their normal legislative processes. Id. at 954-55.
16. Although there will still be national differences in how the data is interpreted, harmonizing the
procedure of approval is seen as an important first step toward globalization.
1996]
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ICH is to speed up the time from development to marketing of new drugs. The
first goal may be achievable, but there is no guarantee that it will lead to
achievement of the second. If it does, it will be the first time that major
regulatory reform has decreased the time from development to market for new
drugs. 7 The worst possible scenario would be that ICH would simply add
another layer of bureaucratic red tape to an already over-regulated industry.
The United States, represented by the FDA, similar agencies of the
European Union and Japan, and industry representatives came together in 1991
for the First ICH (ICHI) in Brussels, Belgium." The ICHI participants agreed
to drop a controversial animal-based test, LD-50. 9 They also agreed to work
toward harmonizing stability-testing guidelines and generally clarified several
cross-national misconceptions about pharmaceutical regulations 0 and scientific
definitions." Most importantly, they established a process of negotiated
rulemaking whereby harmonized guidelines could be developed.2 . Seen as
more of a momentous political summit than a scientific conference, ICHI set
the stage to launch the pharmaceutical industry into a worldwide political
player, influencing health care and economic decisions at the highest levels of
government.'
17. In Britain, drug development times increased between 20% and 300% after passage of the
Medicines Act in 1971. John Dillman, Note, Prescription Drug Approval and Terminal Diseases:
Desperate Times Require Desperate Measures, 44 VAND. L. REv. 925, 935 (1991). See also Note, FDA
Reform and the European Medicines Evaluation Agency, 108 HARV. L. REV. 2009 (1995) (explaining that
drug innovation in U.S. declined after 1962 drug amendments) [hereinafter Note, FDA Reform].
18. Over 1000 participants attended ICHI. Vogel, supra note 6, at 22.
19. Global Harmonisation, supra note 7. The Lethal-Dose 50 test was conducted by administering
differing levels of doses to laboratory animals to determine the dose at which 50% of the animals died.
Vogel, supra note 6, at 23 n.75.
20. Global Harmonisation, supra note 7. Stability testing is the measurement of a drug's shelf life
under a variety of storage conditions (humidity, temperature, etc.).
2 1. Vogel, supra note 6, at 23. For example, before ICH, the EU, Japan, and the United States lacked
a common definition of "room temperature." Now, that term, as well as other laboratory control conditions,
are precisely defined. Id.
22. Contrera, supra note 11, at 940. Rulemaking proceeds under the ICH as follows: (1) the
Steering Committee (SC) appoints expert working groups (EWG); (2) the EWG prioritize the problems
posed by inconsistent regulation and the likelihood of obtaining a consensus toward harmonization; (3) the
EWG makes recommendations to the SC, which forwards the draft to the respective regulatory agencies in
each of the three countries for formal consultation; (4) the draft guidelines are modified by the regulatory
agencies, then returned to the EWG for their final approval; (5) the EWG then sends the final draft back to
the SC; (6) the SC either approves or makes changes to the draft text, then submits the harmonized guideline
to the respective agencies for adoption into their national laws according to national or regional procedures.
Id at 940 n.57.
23. Global Harmonisation, supra note 7.
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In October 1992, ICH2 took place in Orlando, Florida, with over 1600
scientists and health authorities in attendance.24 The conference achieved
significant advances toward harmonization in the following areas: reducing
the need for animal-based experiments detecting toxicity to reproductive
systems; guidelines for drug studies in the elderly; and establishing definitions
and standards for clinical safety data management.2" Agreement was also
reached for issuing draft guidelines covering many facets of Good Clinical
Practices (GCPs). The draft included guidelines for investigators, definitions
and terminology for analytical method validation, and guidelines on the
number of patients necessary to assess clinical safety of certain long-term
drugs.26
In November, 1995, some 2400 delegates representing pharmaceutical
companies and forty governments took part in ICH3, which was held in
Japan.27 ICH3 focused on further harmonizing international guidelines for
clinical testing of new drugs. Major changes in that area are expected in
Japan.28 Currently, Japanese regulations do not require the written, informed
consent from patients participating in clinical trials.29 The new agreement
places greater onus on the manufacturers during the proposal stage of clinical
testing to ensure compliance with the new rules.3"
Standardizing the requirements of the pre-clinical stage of drug
development was notable but the real work is still ahead. A potential drug
spends a relatively short time in the pre-clinical stage,3' hence the majority of
regulations apply to the clinical stages and beyond. If ICH3 succeeds in
harmonizing the clinical trial stage requirements,32 several areas of
24. Pharma Harmonization "Helps Patients, " Says ICH, MARKETLET-rER, Nov. 15, 1993, available
in 1993 WL 2826181.
25. Id
26. Id.
27. Conference Plans Standardized Approach to New Medicines, Japan Economic Newswire, Nov.
29, 1995, available in 1995 WL, ALLNEWSPLUS [hereinafter Conference Plans Approach].
28. See Experts Agree on Standard Approach to Pharmaceuticals, Japan Economic Newswire, Dec.
1, 1995, available in 1995 WL, ALLNEWSPLUS [hereinafter Experts Agree on Approach].
29. Conference Plans Approach, supra note 27.
30. Experts Agree on Approach, supra note 28.
31. Once a potential drug is identified n the laboratory as possibly effective against a particular
disease or illness and a reliable method of manufacturing has been developed, the drug moves into the
"clinical" stage.
32. A harmonized guideline for GCPs was adopted by the ICH and is in the process of approval in
the United States, Japan, and the European Union. ICH Steering Committee Expert Groups Meet,
MARKETLETTER, May 13, 1996, available in 1996 WL 9648709. At 1CH3 it was also agreed to develop a
harmonized dictionary of medical terminology to be used by the industry and regulatory agencies
worldwide. Int 7 Organization to be Created to Maintain "Regulatory Terminology", PHARMA JAPAN, Apr.
1996]
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
pharmaceutical development and marketing come to mind as potential
candidates for harmonization. Such areas include drug labeling and
advertising, post-approval monitoring of adverse side effects, use of Good
Manufacturing Practices (GMPs) and Good Laboratory Practices (GLPs).
Originally, ICH was envisioned to be a six-year process, but ICH4 is already
being planned for 1997 in Belgium.
II. REGULATORY HARMONIZATION WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION
A. The EU Approach to New Drug Approvals
With the EU now representing eighteen countries and more than 370
million people,34 it is, the world's largest integrated pharmaceutical market. In
1993, it accounted for more than seventy billion dollars of the world market.35
The EU's pharmaceutical industry ranks fourth of all industries when it comes
to being hindered by inconsistent technical regulations.36 The countries of the
EU anticipated the importance of a borderless pharmaceutical market long
before the world as a whole. 7 The road to a borderless pharmaceutical society
in the EU, however, has been plagued by numerous setbacks. 8 Directive
65/65 EEC39 laid the groundwork in 1965 to establish a borderless drug
market. However, the centralized European agency for drug approvals, the
European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA), did not become a reality
until thirty years later.' The EU Commission has found it very difficult to
legislate EU-wide pharmaceutical regulations because Member States
8, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8005674.
33. Harmonization Conference in '97, BBI NEWSLETrER, Apr. i, 1996, available in 1996 WL
8625149.
34. With New Members, European Union Enlarges to about 371 Million, MARKET EUR., Dec. 1,
1994, available in 1994 WL 2106897.
35. Europe's Pharmaceutical Industry in 1993, supra note 5.
36. Colleen K. Ottoson, Note, Regulation of Biotechnology in the European Community: How
Twelve Nations are Transforming a Global Industry, 16 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 255, 260 (1992).
37. See Vogel, supra note 6, at 8.
38. Louis H. Orzack et al., Pharmaceutical Regulation in the European Community: Barriers to
Single Market Integration, 17 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 847, 861-62 (1992).
39. Council Directive 65/65 EEC of 26 January 1965 on the Approximation of Provisions Laid Down
by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action Relating to Proprietary Medicinal Products, 1965 0.1(22)
269.
40. 1993 in Europe--A New Internationalism, supra note I.
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tenaciously cling to control over health care and the drug industry as one of the
cornerstones of their national sovereignty."'
The EU efforts to harmonize can be studied as a prototype for the larger,
international approach being advocated by ICH. The direction Europe takes
during the next four or five years may be the precursor of where ICH is
headed. This section will discuss the two current drug approval systems in the
EU--how they work, how they evolved, how they may continue to evolve, and
how they may be used to predict the future of international harmonization on
a larger scale.
1. The Multistate Procedure 1975 - 1995
In 1975, the EU created the Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products
(CPMP) and a multistate procedure, sometimes called mutual recognition, for
approvals. 2 Prior to 1975, manufacturers who wished to market their products
in different Member States had to apply separately to each individual State,
and then the States either approved or rejected the application with no regard
to the decision of their neighbors."3 The CPMP includes representatives from
all Member States and also from the European Commission." The CPMP's
mandate was to replace the drug regulatory systems of the EC's twelve
existing Member States EC with a single supervisory agency. 5 Under the
mutual recognition system, a drug manufacturer could apply for approval in
one Member State, and once approval was granted there, the manufacturer
could seek approval in as many as five other member States at the same time. '
The regulatory bodies in those States could learn from the CPMP that at least
one other Member State had granted approval for the drug."7 In theory, the
41. Pharmaceutical Industry: European Parliament Hearing on Industrial Policy, Multinational
Service, Oct. 1, 1995, available in 1995 WL 9431945. The reconciliation of these conflicting desires
presents a "daunting challenge." EFPIA Debates Obstacles for Pharma Industry, MARKETLE"rER, June 12,
1995, available in 1995 WL 2153253.
42. Orzack et. al., supra note 38, at 855-56.
43. Individual approvals are costly for the industry because they often result in making the same
product subject to different control testing during the manufacturing process. Since most manufacturers do
not know, during the critical manufacturing process, where a particular lot will ultimately be marketed, they
are forced to either "overtest" the product or manufacture specific lots for each market.
44. Orzack et al., supra note 38, at 855.
45. Id.
46. Id. Manufacturers were not required to use the new system. They could still seek individual
approvals from each country in which they wished to market their products. Id.
47. Id.
19961
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additional States were required to consider the initial approval when
conducting their own reviews; in practice, however, they retained broad
authority to raise an objection and could thus decide not to admit a certain
product even if it was recommended by the CPMP. 48
Instead of opening the national markets by speeding the approval process,
the multistate procedure caused numerous delays as the individual countries
routinely raised objections to mutual recognition.49 In 1988, the CPMP noted
that "there have been objections with regard to every case dealt with under the
Multi-State [sic] procedure... .50 The CPMP Chairman concluded that "[o]n
the whole the Member States do not yet accept each other's assessments."51
Although the new system resulted in Member States participating in the CPMP
process, final approval has "clearly remained with national bodies."52
2. The Multistate Procedure 1995 - 1998
Beginning in 1995, a new multistate procedure, sometimes called "mutual
recognition," went into effect to strengthen the authority of the CPMP
decision. 3 Under the new system, a company applies to one Member State
first, which makes a decision and issues an assessment report.' The company
can then apply to additional States and the assessment report is forwarded to
them and to the CPMP.55 The additional countries have ninety days to decide
whether to accept or deny the initial approval. 6 The directive requires
Member States to recognize the original approval unless "there are grounds for
supposing that ... the medicinal product concerned may present a risk to
public health."" The directive also allows Member States to approve a product
48. Id
49. Id
50. Id. (quoting C.A. Teijgler, The Role of CPMP in the EEC, in INTERNATIONAL MEDICINES
REGULATIONS: A FORWARD LOOK TO 1992 (SR. Walker and J.P. Griffin, eds., 1989).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 858.
53. Council Directive 93/39 EEC of 14 June 1993 Amending Directives 65/65 EEC, 75/318 EEC
and 75/319 EEC in Respect of Medicinal Products, 1993 O.J. (L 214) 22; Richard F. Kingham, Esq. et al.,
The New European Medicines Agency, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 301,309 (1994).
54. Kinghan et al., supra note 53, at 310.
55. Id.
56. Id
57. Directive 93/39, supra note 53, art. 3.1, at 26. Unlike the previous system, the new directive does
not permit a Member State to refuse recognition if approval would be contrary to their patent or
"exclusivity" laws. This may create a conflict with other EU directives governing periods of exclusivity.
The European Court of Justice may have to resolve this difficult dilemma. Kingham et al., supra note 53,
[Vol. 4:183
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pursuant to special conditions but must be imposed only for "objective and
verifiable reasons.""8 Disputes are referred to the CPMP which issues an
opinion on the matter.5 9 Under the new system, the opinion is made binding
by going through the same tedious Commission and Council procedure as for
concertation, described in the next section.'
Some indication of the general nervousness about the new multistate
system was the surge in last-minute filings under the old multistate
procedure.6' Multistate filings under the old system doubled in the final three
months of 1994, bringing the total for the year to sixty-four (previously the
average had been approximately fifty per year).62
In addition to the new multistate system, drug firms may continue to
pursue individual country approvals until 1998. However, as of January 1,
1998, "any Member State that receives an application for a drug that is already
approved by another EC country is required to automatically recognize that
approval." This should make mutual recognition mandatory, but the Member
States will still have the option to refer the matter to the CPMP for
arbitration.' If the old system is any indication, referrals will become the
norm and approval times will most likely increase, at least in the short term.65
3. The Concertation Procedure 1987 - 1995
In 1987, the concertation procedure was introduced through Directive
87/22 EEC.' The concertation system applies to the small but important class
of products developed from biotechnology or "high technology."67 Limiting
at 319.
58. Directive 93/39, supra note 53, art. 1.9, at 24.
59. Id. art. 13, at24-28.
60. Kingham et al.,supra note 53, at 310-13.
61. No Rubber Stamp From Mutual Recognition, OTC BusINEss NEws, Feb. 28, 1995, available
in 1995 WL 8375880 [hereinafter No Rubber Stamp].
62. Id.
63. Kingham et al., supra note 53, at 311-12.
64. Id. at312.
65. ld at315.
66. Council Directive 87/22 EEC of 22 December 1986 on the Approximation of National Measures
Relating to the Placing on the Market of High-Technology Medicinal Products, 1987 O.J. (L 15) 38.
67. Orzack et al., supra note 38, at 856. "Biotechnology products" refers to those derived from DNA
technology such as Eli Lillys insulin drug, Humulin, genetic coding of biologically active proteins, and
monoclonal antibodies. High technology medicines include compounds based on radioisotopes, products
administered by technologically advanced delivery systems, and products resulting from major technical or
scientific breakthroughs. Id at 856-57.
1996]
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the products covered by this system was thought necessary in order to allow
a gradual transfer of power from the Member States to the EC." While
companies making such products from biotechnology were required to use this
procedure, high-tech products were permitted, but not required, to use it.69
Under this procedure, a manufacturer submitted an application to the CPMP
and one Member State at the same time.7' That Member State's regulatory
agency acted as a rapporteur to the CPMP.7" The rapporteur had a stated
maximum of 210 days after receipt of a valid application to issue its report to
the CPMP, but that did not include time spent by the applicant providing
additional information or explanations.72 The CPMP was also required to issue
its own advisory report within 180 days of the original submission, which the
rapporteur could consider when writing its opinion.73
Once the rapporteur's evaluation was received, the manufacturer could
then submit the application to other Member States.7' The CPMP and the
rapporteur acted as communication facilitators between the applicant and the
other Member States. The CPMP oversaw and commented upon all applicant
responses.76 After all requests for information had been satisfied, the CPMP
issued an opinion recommending approval or disapproval." Member States
then had thirty days to decide whether to follow the CPMP recommendation.7"
4. The Concertation Procedure After 1995
EU Regulation 2309/93'9 established the EMEA to coordinate the
evaluation of scientific data associated with the approval, manufacturing, and
inspection of medicines in the EU. 0 The EMEA is designed to be an advisory
68. Evelyne Friedel & Michael Freundlich, European Community Harmonization of the Licensing
and Manufacturing of Medicinal Products, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 141, 163 (1994).
69. Orzack et al., supra note 38, at 857.
70. Id
71. Id.
72. Friedel & Freundlich, supra note 68, at 158 n.90.
73. Id at 158.
74. Orzack et al., supra note 38, at 857.
75. Id
76. Id
77. Kingham et al., supra note 53, at 306.
78. The recommendation was not legally binding. Friedel & Freundlich, supra note 68, at 158.
79. Council Regulation 2309/93 EEC of 22 July 1993 Laying Down Community Procedures for the
Authorization and Supervision of Medicinal Products for Human and Veterinary Use and Establishing a
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, 1993 O.J. (L 214) 1.
80. Friedel & Freundlich, supra note 68, at 159-60.
[Vol. 4:183
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agency only, providing supervision to the CPMP and the national authorities."
The regulation also repealed Directive 87/22 EEC." The concertation
procedure remains mandatory for biotechnology products and optional for
other high-technology products, but the new procedure should result in one
marketing approval that will be valid throughout the EU. 3
Under the new system, applications are submitted directly to the EMEA,
which refers the matter to the CPMP for review." Within 210 days the CPMP
must issue an opinion determined by a simple majority vote. 5 If the CPMP
votes for approval, the opinion is forwarded to the European Commission, all
Member States, and the applicant.' The Commission prepares a draft decision
and forwards it to all concerned." The Commission then consults with the
Standing Committee on Medicinal Products for Human Use (composed of
representatives from all Member States, voting by a weighted majority).8 If
the Standing Committee affirms the draft decision, it becomes final. 9 If they
reject the Commission's decision, the issue must be decided by the European
Council.' The Council can support the Standing Committee by voting to
reject the draft decision; however, if they fail to do so within ninety days, the
decision becomes final.9
This complex and time-consuming process is necessary to render a
decision which is binding on all Member States and thus avoid the pitfalls of
the old multistate procedure.' Unlike the FDA, which has congressional
authority to enact binding national regulations, the EMEA and CPMP have no
such power. Those agencies thus centralize the approval process for the most
innovative types of drugs, but unfortunately, they still cannot bind the national
authorities.93 Nonetheless, it is hoped that the new procedure will be less
81. Id. at 160.
82. Id at 159.
83. Id. at 163.
84. Id.
85. Kingharn et al., supra note 53, at 306.
86. Id at 306-07.
87. Id
88. Id
89. Id. at 307.
90. Id
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Orzack et al., supra note 38, at 857-58. Due to the CPMP's dismal record in facilitating mutual
approvals under the previous system, there was considerable criticism of sanctioning the new system. Id.
1996]
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delay-prone than the old concertation system and less costly for small drug
firms, inducing them to expand their markets.
94
B. Problems with EU Harmonization
Continuing evolution of the EU systems for drug approval is evidence that
the EU has not found a completely satisfactory process. This evolution also
indicates that the national governments, the Commission, and the industry
recognize the need for constant re-evaluation and optimization. Although both
multistate and concertation procedures require Commission action to resolve
disputes and create binding arbitration opinions, it is expected that if CPMP
action is routinely approved by the Commission, the number of cases requiring
their intervention will dramatically decrease.95 Thus, the EU is headed toward
a centralized authority for all drug approvals. Innovative medicines will be the
first products to be approved or disapproved under an EU-wide system, but
once the system is optimized, other drugs will surely follow. Despite these
advances, some of the problems in the system remain.
Several of the problems that the EU has experienced (or is experiencing)
also have wider implications for harmonization among the EU, Japan, and the
United States. Perhaps the biggest issue facing the EMEA and the ICH is how
much centralized authority is necessary and how much is possible. The
European Commission issued a draft Notice to Applicants in December 1994,
which reiterated the central tenet of the mutual recognition system;
"authorisation ... in one Member State ought in principle to be recognised by
the competent authorities of the other Member States" (unless there is an
objection based on serious concern for public safety).' However, the
Commission and the executive director of the EMEA have alarmed some
members of the industry by claiming that the national authorities will remain
the "pillars" of the new system.97
In some countries, objections to new drug applications are the norm, yet
the EMEA is powerless to prevent such objections because "there is no legal
mandate" behind mutual recognition.9" The EMEA and the Commission's
procedures are "designed to facilitate, not impose, harmonisation," and the
94. Friedel & Freundlich, supra note 68, at 164.
95. Kinghan et al., supra note 53, at 315.
96. No Rubber Stamp, supra note 61.
97. Id
98. Id
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Commission seems content to rely on the hollow axiom that "science doesn't
recognise national boundaries." The role of the EMEA, according to its
executive director, is "mainly to provide the infrastructure for cooperation."'"
This role sounds strikingly similar to the one advocated for the ICH. The EU
may eventually be forced to delegate decisionmaking powers to the EMEA in
order to achieve a workable, harmonized process,' ° but it seems highly
implausible that the ICH will ever be granted such power.
Another problem in the EU is the apparent assumption that the national
regulatory agencies are more alike than they are different."° Differences in
social and cultural attitudes toward healthcare risks, individual rights, and
governmental responsibilities also cannot be ignored.0 3 There is perhaps more
cultural harmony between the EU countries than among the ICH countries.
Differing levels of political power can also affect harmonization efforts.
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom pressured the EU to ban
pharmaceutical parallel imports from Spain and Portugal in 1985, and the ban
was extended in the fall of 1995."° Northern European drug manufacturers
claim that cheap imports from the two countries would cost domestic
manufacturers up to two billion dollars per year.' The fact that the EU has
not been entirely successful in resolving these differences does not bode well
for the ICH.
Another problem faced by the EU and the ICH alike is that nations which
have the most rigorous standards are pushing to "harmonize upward" versus
the least stringent nations pushing to "harmonize downward."" 6 A "race to the
bottom" sacrifices health and safety standards in favor of freer movement of
goods.0 7 A "race to the top" would result in the opposite, but equally
undesirable outcome.'08 Other problems faced by the EU and the ICH are
99. Id This statement ignores the reality of the situation; if science didn't recognize national borders,
there would be no need for harmonization.
100. EMEA Doors Now Open for Business, MARKETLETTER, Feb. 6, 1995, available in 1995 WL
2151656.
101. This process could only be accomplished from the bottom up-the individual countries would
have to authorize the EU Council to delegate authority to the EMEA.
102. Orzack et al., supra note 38, at 859.
103. Note, FDA Reform, supra note 17, at 2024-25.
104. EU Commission Extends Ban on Parallel Imports, MARKETLETrER, Oct. 16, 1995, available
in 1995 WL 2154506. Spain and Portugal did not have patent legislation to protect drug makers until 1992.
Id
105. Id
106. Orzack et al., supra note 38, at 861.
107. Id
108. Moving in the direction of the highest standards would appear to defeat the very objectives of
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national differences in the following areas: enforcement capabilities; patent
protection; health care systems and insurance coverage; and forms and levels
of governmental subsidies, both to the consumer and the manufacturer. °9
Some measure of uniformity in these peripheral areas, while not absolutely
essential to harmonization of the scientific aspects of pharmaceuticals, would
nonetheless make harmonization more effective. Whether the EU can find a
successful way to deal with these problems without sacrificing harmonization
objectives will provide some indication of whether global harmonization is
truly possible.
MII. THE FDA'S IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION
Just as the pharmaceutical world began working toward international
harmonization, two changes affecting the FDA occurred that might seriously
impact harmonization efforts. First, Congress allowed the agency to expand
its enforcement division, and second, Congress passed the Prescription Drug
User Fee Act of 1992."' Although neither of these developments were
undertaken with the intent to undermine the ICH, they may unfortunately have
that effect because they demonstrate that the FDA and the ICH are moving in
different directions.
A. The Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992
The United States has a very conservative approach to drug regulation,
with perhaps the most rigorous and demanding approval procedures in the
world."' Under current FDA rules, a new drug must satisfy stringent safety
and efficacy requirements before receiving approval for marketing."' The
harmonization-reducing the cost of drug development, speeding the process from development to market,
and making more drugs available to the consumer.
109. Contrera, supra note 11, at 955; Kingham et al., supra note 53, at 317-19; Orzack et al., supra
note 38, at 865.
110. Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, 21 U.S.C. 379(h) (1992) [hereinafter User Fee Act].
111. Dillman, supra note 17, at 925.
112. Note, FDA Reform, supra note 17, at 2012. A new drug must undergo four stages of
investigation under the auspices of the FDA before marketing approval is granted. Julie C. Relihan,
Expediting FDA Approval ofAIDS Drugs: An International Approach, 13 B.U. INT'L. L.J. 229, 235 (1995).
First, a drug must satisfy several pre-clinical hurdles which are designed to evaluate the drug's toxicity to
humans. After the drug is found to be reasonably safe for humans, the manufacturer files a Notice for an
Investigational New Drug (IND) with the FDA. This document must contain, among other things, all
preclinical data information, detailed descriptions of the drug's composition, manufacturing and quality
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FDA and its supporters believe that the myriad of regulations are absolutely
necessary to prevent dangerous drugs from reaching the U.S. market."3 When
one considers that virtually all major legislation regarding pharmaceuticals has
been the direct result of public health tragedies, it is hard to argue for
dismantling the present structure."4
In recent years, however, many people have argued for dismantling the
system."5 The FDA is frequently criticized for an alleged "drug lag" between
the United States and European countries." 6 It is estimated that this drug lag
has caused thousands of needless deaths due to the unavailability of lifesaving
drugs." 7 The FDA responded in the early 1990s by loosening restrictions on
the availability of some experimental drugs and accelerating the approval
process for promising new drugs through a variety of means, including the
User Fee Act."' The passage of the User Fee Act was "the biggest change at
the FDA in thirty years.""' 9 The Act permits the FDA to charge a fee for
reviewing a company's drug application; the monies generated will allow the
control methods, an outline of proposed phases for further investigation, and an agreement by the
manufacturer to report all serious side effects. Clinical trials on humans may begin 30 days after the FDA
receives the IND. Dillman, supra note 17, at 928.
Human clinical trials occur in three or four phases. Phase I involves a very small group of healthy test
subjects and focuses on the drug's absorption, rate of metabolism, and elimination. Any toxic effects
undetected during preclinical studies would hopefully be discovered during this phase. Phase II testing
involves a small population of symptomatic patients and allows the manufacturer the first opportunity to
evaluate the drug's efficacy in human subjects. Phase Ill is the costliest stage in the development of a new
drug. It may involve thousands of patients in dozens of clinical sites around the world. Id. at 928-29.
At the end of Phase III testing, which may last several years, the manufacturer may file a New Drug
Application (NDA). The NDA contains all manufacturing and testing data concerning the final drug
composition. The NDA may consist of hundreds of binders containing tens of thousands of pages of data.
The FDA reviews all of this data and then decides to approve or disapprove the drug. Id. at 930.
113. Note, FDA Reform, supra note 17, at 2024.
114. Id. at 2012; C. Frederick Beckner, II, Note, The FDA's War On Drugs, 82 GEo. L.J. 529,
529-30 (1993); Contrera, supra note II, at 932-35.
115. Beckner, supra note 114, at 529; Dillman, supra note 17, at 925; Linda Domey, Comment,
Culpable Conduct with Impunity: The Blood Industry and the FDA's Responsibility for the Spread of AIDS
Through Blood Products, 3 J. PHARMACY & L. 129, 130-31 (1994); Kibbe, supra note 3; See Relihan, supra
note 112.
116. Dillman, supra note 17, at 934; Note, FDA Reform, supra note 17, at 2014; Randall Mikkelsen,
FDA Red Tape Pushes Testing Overseas, Drug Maker Says; Congressional Reforms to Speed up Approvals
are Needed, Hoffinan-LaRoche President Says, THE ORANGE CouNTY REGISTER (Cal.), Aug. 18, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 5866076.
117. Note, FDA Reform, supra note 17, at 2014.
118. Id. at 2015.
119. Relihan, supra note 112, at 244.
1996]
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
agency to expand its- review staff by fifty percent. 20 The industry generally
welcomed the Act's passage. 12
The agency claims these measures have decreased the approval times for
new drugs from 26.7 months in 1993 to just 19 months in 1994. In late 1995,
the agency announced that the supposed drug lag had been conquered.22
Critics of the FDA maintain, however, that approval times have decreased
because the agency is asking for substantially more clinical data up front,
before the FDA review "clock" starts running." The critics also claim that the
User Fee Act, while helping important new drugs gain faster approval, has
caused other non-lifesaving medicines to pay the cost with increased approval
times. 24
The debate over approval times, however, seems to focus on the wrong
question; the real issue is whether all those regulations are in fact necessary.
ICH is attempting to answer this question. If the User Fee Act accomplishes
what it is supposed to accomplish--speeding the approval process-that may
just institutionalize the overkill. If ICH guidelines end up at odds with FDA
regulations, the FDA may derail ICH goals by digging in its heels as the next
section demonstrates.
B. FDA Enforcement Initiatives
The FDA's approval requirements are especially rigorous because the
FDA has perhaps the world's foremost enforcement division. FDA
Commissioner, David Kessler, has made enforcement the agency's top
priority. 5 A fundamental tenet of the FDA's enforcement philosophy is that
most firms and most people have a genuine desire to comply with the
regulations.'26 Nonetheless, the FDA has a wide assortment of enforcement
120. Id.
121. Contrera, supra note 11, at 959-60.
122. Note, FDA Reform, supra note 17, at 2015; Lauran Neergaard, FDA Report Aims to Deflect
Criticism that It's Slow in Approving New Drugs, THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 13, 1995, at A 16.
123. Note, FDA Reform, supra, note 17 at 2015. The FDA may not necessarily be asking for more
information, but instead may be only more clearly defining what information is necessary for an acceptable
submission.
124. Id.
125. Arvin P. Shroff, FDA Enforcement Initiatives in the United States and Abroad, 49 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 575, 575 (1994). The FDA has approximately 3900 employees engaged in inspection and
enforcement activities. Alan L. Hoeting, The FDA's Enforcement Program, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 405,406
(1992).
126. Marie A. Urban, The FDA's Policy on Seizures, Injunctions, Civil Fines, and Recalls, 47 FOOD
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tools available to ensure compliance." These tools include administrative,
civil, and criminal measures.'28 In recent years, the FDA has raised the civil
penalties for violations, 9 and it increasingly seeks criminal convictions by
joining forces with other federal agencies, like the Department of Justice, to
investigate and prosecute violators. 3 '
The FDA has extremely broad authority over imported materials;'
however, by increasing its control over the domestic market the FDA
continues to expand its influence over foreign drug manufacturers and
suppliers. By expanding the regulations vertically to cover production,
storage, testing, transportation, and labeling of every raw material or ingredient
used in the manufacturing of a domestic pharmaceutical, the power of the FDA
reaches well beyond U.S. borders.
This "vertical enforcement" can be seen in the FDA's efforts to regulate
the bulk pharmaceutical industry. Between seventy and eighty percent of bulk
pharmaceutical chemicals (BPCs) used for over-the-counter drugs are imported
into the United States, 32 yet the FDA "really doesn't have any good data"
regarding compliance with regulations covering GMPs because the FDA
inspects few foreign bulk sites.13  The agency has increased its enforcement
and inspection efforts of foreign BPC suppliers, but often the damage is done
before the FDA learns about it.'34 FDA regulation of foreign BPC suppliers
could theoretically harm other ICH countries that depend on those suppliers
for raw materials because it gives the FDA power to pull strings behind the
scenes.
When a foreign manufacturer applies for approval to market a finished
product in the United States, the FDA conducts a full inspection of its
manufacturing and testing sites.'35 Of all foreign firms that are inspected,
& DRUG L.J. 411, 411 (1992).
127. Id.
128. Id
129. Shroff, supra note 125, at 577.
130. Hoeting, supra note 125, at 408-09; Civil Division, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, New Unit to
Prosecute FDA Fraud, 3 No. 4 DOJ ALERT 8 (1993) available in WL, PH-DOJALT.
131. Under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, the FDA can take action against an imported product
upon a finding of an apparent violation. To move against a domestic item, the FDA must prove to a judge
or jury, usually by a preponderance of the evidence, that the article violates the Act. Paul M. Hyman, Legal
Overview of FDA Authority Over Imports, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 525, 527 (1994).
132. OTC and Dietary Supplement Labeling Compliance Under New FDA Division, THE TAN
SHEET, Oct. 23, 1995, available in WL, FDC-RPTS-C.
133. Id
134. Shroff, supra note 125, at 578.
135. Troy E. Williams, Jr., FDA Investigators and Investigations in the 1990s, 47 FOOD & DRUG
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thirty-four percent are not in compliance.'36 The agency is reviewing its
findings of the past few years in hopes of instituting a more effective strategy
for dealing with foreign companies that do not maintain compliance. 37
One such strategy is a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with a
foreign government. The FDA recently signed such an agreement with
Russia.13 1 Under the MOU, Russia is to rely on the FDA's approval,
inspection, and enforcement systems for U.S. drugs sold to Russia.'
Although some in the industry are skeptical, this will no doubt be a huge boon
to U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturers; Russia has annual drug sales of greater
than $300 billion, and previously only a very small percentage of U.S. drugs
had penetrated that market.'40 The FDA is seeking to expand MOUs to
foodstuffs in Russia and to negotiate MOUs with other members of the former
Soviet Union. 4'
Under these unilateral agreements, the FDA's involvement in the
regulation of foreign drug industries increases rather than decreases. 4 '
Although an MOU gives the FDA legal authority to rely on inspections
conducted by the foreign country, an MOU is often established because the
foreign country lacks the expertise to ensure that FDA standards are
implemented.'43 For the MOU with Russia, for example, the FDA must train
Russian inspectors to use FDA methods and information systems.'"
The FDA prefers to negotiate MOUs on its own terms rather than rely on
international efforts to harmonize inspection and enforcement.'45 The agency
obviously does not feel bound by international harmonization agreements.
The Deputy Director of the FDA Office of Enforcement has stated, "the FDA
does not need to use international standards if it feels they do not ensure
adequate consumer protection. Such standards include Codex and ISO
[9000]. ' I' 46 Presumably, such standards would also include the EU's mark of
L.J. 279, 283-84 (1992).
136. Shroff, supra note 125, at 578.
137. Id. at 578-79.
138. Id. at 578. The FDA also has partial MOUs with Switzerland, Sweden, Canada, and Japan.
Relihan, supra note 112, at 257-58 n. 214.
139. Shroff, supra note 125, at 578.
140. Vogel, supra note 6, at 20-2 1.
141. Shroff, supra note 125, at 578.
142. Contrera, supra note 1I, at 949.
143. Contrera, supra note 11, at 949; Relihan, supra note 112, at 257.
144. Shroff, supra note 125, at 578.
145. See id. at 578-79.
146. Id. He also stated that "NAFTA does not require the agency to do anything differently than
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quality for medical devices, the "CE" Mark.'47 Another unsettling aspect of the
FDA's power over foreign drug manufacturing is that when the agency denies
admission into the United States, a foreign drug manufacturer has no right to
judicial review of the decision. 4
The FDA would prefer that it, and not the ICH, be in charge of
harmonizing certain inspection procedures. "We believe we could find
perhaps a better venue that is more broadly-based worldwide" to foster
discussion of GMP harmonization. 49 The FDA has been negotiating a GMP
agreement with the EU to "harmonize" their inspection processes. 5 ' The
agreement is not as broad as the MOU with Russia, but it would guarantee the
FDA access to the Member States' inspection reports as well as give the FDA
the right to conduct its own inspections in the Member States,' Currently, the
FDA must seek permission before conducting a foreign inspection.
According to FDA Commissioner David Kessler, the FDA has priorities
other than working with ICH on international harmonization.' Before ICH2,
he noted that, "it is possible that the FDA will not be able to move ahead on
some ICH projects with the sense of urgency they may deserve.... [W]e have
what it has done in the past." Id Codex Alimentarius Commission is a UN-affiliated international
standards-setting organization for food products. Susan MacKnight, Big Could be Bigger: US. Farm and
Food Sales to Japan, JEI Report, July 26, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, NWLTRS File. ISO
9000 Services is an internationally recognized evaluation and certification process of individual quality
management systems. ISO 9000 Series Offers a Systematic Approach to QM, Korea Economic Daily,
December 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, NWLTRS File.
147. "CE" is interpreted variously as, "Commission Europeen," "Conformite Europeene," or
"Communaute Europeene." To gain the CE Mark, a manufacturer is inspected and audited by an authorized
"Notified Body" under EU regulations for quality management and patient and operator safety. The CE
Mark, like the ISO 9000 Certification, is an international symbol of quality management and product safety.
Once the CE Mark is received by the manufacturers, they may market their products throughout the
European Union without undergoing individual country regulations. ATS Medical Receives "CE Mark"
Approval, PR Newswire, March 20, 1995, available in 1995 WL, ALLNEWSPLUS; European Marketing
Approval Awarded to Cellpro 's Ceprate SECURED CREDITOR Stem Cell Concentration System, Business
Wire, July 31, 1995, available in 1995 WL, ALLNEWSPLUS; St. Jude Medical Gets Okay to MA Heart
Valve in E. U., Dow Jones News Service, Sept. 28, 1995, available in 1995 WL, EURONEWS; St. Jude
Medical Receives "CE Mark" Approval, PR Newswire, Nov. 23, 1994, available in 1994 WL,
ALLNEWSPLUS.
148. Hyman, supra note 131, at 529.
149. FDA Drafting Preliminary GMP Agreement for Nov. Meeting with European Union, THE TAN
SHEET, Oct. 2, 1995, available in 1995 WL, FDC-RPTS-C.
150. Id
151. Id
152. Pharma Harmonization "Helps Patients, "Says ICH, supra note 24. Some have argued against
FDA participation in the ICH process because they fear a "race to the bottom" resulting in a lowering of
FDA standards. Contrera, supra note 11, at 951-52.
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to adjust our contribution to our means."'53 Mostly, FDA employees work on
ICH matters "in addition to their other responsibilities."'"1 Congress is in full
control of the FDA, with all the political discretion that implies.' The FDA
may not deviate from congressional policy without authorization in the form
of legislation. "6 Many in the FDA feel that harmonization efforts detract from
the agency's primary goal of drug review.'"
A re-invigorated FDA enforcement division could decrease competition
in the marketplace in two ways. First, drug firms will have to maintain even
more extensive and costly in-house quality assurance and legal defense
programs. Second, if the penalties for non-compliance are too high (or too
numerous), drug firms, even highly reputable firms, literally will not be able
to afford mistakes.5 8 While some firms undoubtedly should be eliminated
from the market because their products are unsafe, the real question for
enforcement is the same as for the approval process: Are the standards too
high? Instead of questioning the enforcement system at its fundamental,
scientific level, the FDA has merely improved the mechanics of the system.
Coupled with an expanded review staff, this does not bode well for the efforts
of the ICH.
IV. OTHER BARRIERS TO INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION
In addition to the obstacles previously discussed, there remain a number
of difficulties which must be addressed before a truly global pharmaceutical
market can be achieved. Not all of these problems can be resolved by the ICH.
So far, ICH has limited itself to only the scientific aspect of drug regulations.
Thus, most of these other issues will have to be addressed by other
multinational cooperative bodies, or perhaps by the national political entities.
153. Pharma Harmonization "Helps Patients, " Says ICH, supra note 24. See also Contrera, supra
note !1, at 952 (referring to FDA Task Force Study which concluded that FDA resources were not adequate
to conduct international activities).
154. ICH Shifting Focus from Common Dossier to Common Core Technical Data Set, THE PINK
SHEET, Sept. 25, 1995, available in 1995 WL, FDC-RPTS-C.
155. See statement of Fred W. Lyons on behalf of Pharmaceutical Research and Manufactures of
America before the Commerce Committee. FDA Approval Process, FEDERAL DOCUMENT CLEARING
HOUSE, INC., May 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10163340 (stating that the FDA has been the most studied
agency over the years).
156. Beckner, supra note 114, at 539.
157. Contrera, supra note 11, at 953.
158. See generally U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 130 (discussing criminal prosecution of
corporate officials).
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One major barrier to international harmonization is the huge cultural
difference between the East and the West.'59 Compared to Western countries,
Japan and other Asian countries have very different philosophies about
medicine, health, and doctors. Western manufacturers have resisted
conducting clinical trials in Japan because doctors there are frequently
unwilling to follow the protocols precisely."6  This leads to skewed and
unreliable data. Another cultural difference is the unwillingness of Americans
to accept any level of risk when it comes to pharmaceutical products.'6 ' Surely
the American people must bear some of the responsibility for the inordinately
high standards imposed by the FDA.
International harmonization proponents also cannot ignore that issues
affecting pharmaceuticals are often political and social, not just scientific or
economic.'62 The regulation of drugs is virtually synonymous with notions of
national sovereignty. In Europe, it is said that "pharmaceuticals and politics
go together."'63 The same can be said of the American and Japanese drug
industries. The drug industry has strong ties to cultural and societal norms
concerning public health and safety, to the agencies responsible for the
evaluation of new drugs, and to various special interest groups of professionals
and consumers.'" These forces frequently pull the industry in different
directions, both within a single country and across the international scene.
ICH only directly addresses the harmonization of products and clinical
practices, not the regulatory agencies, which are subject to intense politicizing
in all the countries involved. It is unclear how much harmonization is possible
without successfully integrating the various forces that influence the industry.
Another barrier to harmonization is the notion that success must be
measured by a resulting decrease in the cost of drugs--either to the consumer,
the manufacturer, or both.'65 It is true that ICHI and ICH2 reduced some
decidedly overzealous testing during a new drug's early stages. Most of the
costs associated with drug development occur, however, in the later stages of
159. Barriers to Harmonization Include Medical Practice, Marketing History, Ethnicity, THE PINK
SHEET, Sept. 25, 1995, available in 1995 WL, FDC-RPTS-C.
160. In Japan, when administering a pharmaceutical, the doctor may decide on his own to mix it with
dried herbs and roots from the local area to increase its effectiveness.
161. Note, FDA Reform, supra note 17 at 2025-26.
162. Orzack et al., supra note 38, at 852.
163. Id
164. Id at 847.
165. Some commentators have argued that the advances of ICH I and ICH2 will reduce the cost of
developing new drugs. Contrera, supra note 11, at 953.
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testing, the human clinical trials. Also, considering that the FDA may define
the quality of drug manufacturing and that the Japanese will likely set the
standards for drug testing, it is almost certain that the harmonization process
will raise international standards" and increase costs to the industry and to the
consumer.
It is not certain that international harmonization will ever decrease costs.
A well known study conducted by Professor Sam Peltzman, and updated
recently by Robert Hahn and John Hird, estimated that FDA regulations give
rise to a "dead weight loss" of up to three billion dollars a year.167 Moreover,
with each major new piece of FDA legislation in the United States, the average
review time for approval of new drugs increased dramatically.6" The industry
and the public need to realize that, even if ICH succeeds, it will be only a small
part of the solution.
The problem is exacerbated because international harmonization requires
symmetry, and ironically the pharmaceutical industry is incredibly diverse and
driven by notably asymmetrical forces. There are a few very large players, but
there are literally thousands of smaller "boutique" drug firms.'69 Europe alone
has more than 2000 drug companies and seven of the world's top ten
pharmaceutical firms. '7 Large companies have a distinct advantage over
smaller competitors. 7 ' For example, the large players can afford to devote
significant manpower to international issues such as licensing, certification,
and distribution agreements. Another advantage is that many large
pharmaceutical companies established European and American subsidiaries
long ago, and now these subsidiaries play a very important role in overall
company performance.' The organization, reputation, effectiveness, and
procedures of these companies all have significant national differences.
166. In -fact, it is the intention of the FDA to raise the ICH standards. Id. at 951-53.
167. Beckner, supra note 114, at 530. "Dead weight loss is '[a] measure of efficiency loss, given
by the sum of lost consumer and producer surplus."' Id. at 529 n. 14 (quoting RuBIN PINDYCH & DANIEL
RUBENFELD, MICROECONOMICS 684 (2d ed. 1992).
168. Id. at 531.
169. In Germany, there are 600 pharmaceutical firms, and 2/3 of them are small, national companies.
Orzack et al., supra note 38, at 848.
170. New EFPIA Data on the European Pharma Industry, MARKETLETrER, June 5, 1995, available
in 1995 WL 2153139.
171. Gomez, supra note 4.
172. Id.
173. Id
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Formulating policies and promulgating regulations to monitor all aspects of the
entire industry is "at best uncertain."""
One of the main obstacles to a true world market is the great disharmony
of patent laws around the world.'75 There is strong evidence that the vitality
of any modem health care system is directly dependent upon a strong
intellectual property regime. 7 6 The European biotechnology industry suffered
a major blow in March 1995 when the EU rejected the Biotechnology Patent
Directive, which would have permitted the patenting of certain life forms.'"
The directive would have allowed the EU to compete more effectively with
American and Japanese drug companies that already enjoy significant legal
protection in their respective countries.""
As with any international agreement, ICH needs to maintain a clear focus
on its original goals. Early successes of the ICH and the recognition of a great
need for international cooperation have led some to advocate a type of
"mission creep."79 Peter Southerland, former European Community
Commissioner for Ireland, has urged the European Federation of
Pharmaceutical Industries' Association to be more aggressive in demanding
that non-drug health care technology and treatments be subjected to the same
174. Orzack et al., supra note 38, at 848.
175. Although the General Agreement on Tariffs Treaty is expected to alleviate some of the
problems associated with patent laws in a world market, countries are allowed a generous transition period
before pharmaceuticals will be effectively protected against product infringement and unequal treatment.
TRIPs Transition Period "Far Too Long": IFPMA, MARKETLETrER, May 22, 1995, available in 1995 WL
2152927. For an analysis of the global harmonization of patent law, see Anthony Sabatelli & J.C. Rasser,
Impediments To Global Patent Law Harmonization, 22 N. KY. L. REV. 579 (1995).
176. Although India is plagued with recurrent health epidemics of easily treatable diseases,
manufacturers have avoided that country because of poor patent protection. See Indian Industry Seminar
Discusses Patents, MARKETLETTER, May 22, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2152963. Even though China
represents more than 22% of the world's population, manufacturers had also previously avoided China, until
it agreed to increase enforcement of intellectual property rights. US Industry Welcomes China Trade Treaty,
MARKETLETTER, Mar. 6, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2151973. Problems even exist among developed
countries. For example, some countries have attempted to exploit their participation in the Human Genome
Project by trying to patent identified gene sequences. Barbara Looney, Note, Should Genes be Patented?
The Gene Patenting Controversy: Legal, Ethical, and Policy Foundations of an International Agreement,
26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 231,245 (1994).
177. EUAPs Reject Biotech Patent Directive, MARKETLETTER, Mar. 6, 1995, available in 1995 WL
2151972.
178. Id
179. Mission creep occurs when an organization's original objectives shift and expand to include
less focused and less realistic goals.
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level of regulatory scrutiny as the pharmaceutical industry."8 This is entirely
beyond the scope of ICH goals.
One possible solution to mission creep is for the ICH to limit its efforts
even further, concentrating on only one or two classes of drugs until the
problems have been resolved.' ICH could follow the lead of the EU's
concertation procedure and focus on harmonizing only the regulatory
apparatuses for medical products derived from biotechnology or high
technology. This would not solve all the problems, since every class of drugs
may present its own particular set of difficulties, but it would allow some
breathing room to resolve the major conflicts. Since the ICH is intended to be
the first step in a long and continuous process, a gradual approach may be the
best approach.
CONCLUSION
Globalization of drug industry regulation promises to radically change the
way consumers, manufacturers, and governments think and act toward health
care. ICH is a small step in the right direction for the pharmaceutical world,
but the benefits may not be as great as hoped. As this article suggests, it will
unfortunately be very easy for ICH to get sidetracked or derailed. The EU is
struggling to standardize the drug regulatory process within its borders, among
countries already committed to a "borderless society" in all other respects. If
they cannot succeed in creating a harmonized pharmaceutical regulatory
system, the future for a worldwide system looks dim indeed. The FDA,
convinced that the U.S. system is best, seems intent on harmonizing the world
one country at a time. It is hoped that harmonization efforts will proceed along
the road that leads to an increase in drugs that are less expensive to make and
easier to market. It is more likely, however, that efforts to harmonize will
exacerbate current regulatory problems and create a whole crop of new ones.
180. Therapeutic Choices and Cost Curbs: Whose Responsibility?, MARKETLETTER, June 5, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 2153128.
181. This does not seem likely since the FDA recently agreed to include the U.S. generic industry
in ICH talks. Previously, ICH guidelines were to apply only to new drugs, but it has expanded to include
basic drug quality issues. US Generic Industry Wins Role at ICH, MARKETLErER, Apr. 8, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 9648291.
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